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Introduction    
 
It   is   my   pleasure   to   present   to   you   the   sixth   issue   of   Études   Ricoeuriennes/Ricoeur   Studies  
(ERRS).  Based  on  the  general  notion  of  “Figures  of  Otherness,”  this  issue  of  ERRS  contains  seven  
texts  concerned  with  one  of  these  figures:  the  feminine.    
Strictly   speaking,   Ricoeur   never   addressed   the   theme   of   the   feminine   –   in   contrast,   for  
example,  with  Emmanuel  Levinas.  It  is  true  that  one  can  find  some  references  to  this  theme  or  to  
women,  but  with  no  proper  development  or  conceptual  deepening.  There  are  nonetheless  some  
good  reasons   for  exploring   the  notion  of   the  “feminine”   in  Ricoeur’s   thought.  For  a  start,   there  
are   at   least   three   main   topics   in   his   philosophy   that   intersect   with   the   concerns   of   feminist  
thinkers:   identity,   recognition,   and   otherness   (or   foreignness).     We   also   believe   it   is   the  whole  
spirit  of  Ricoeur’s  philosophical  project  that  can  be  of  interest  to  feminist  studies  and  contribute  
to   their   renewal.  This  conviction  comes   to  be   reinforced  by   the   relation  of   this  philosophical   to  
non-­‐‑philosophical   issues,  whether   it  be  the  multi-­‐‑disciplinary  approach  that  these  projects  need  
or   its   denaturalization   of   certain   canonical   concepts   by   denying   their   apparent   purity   and  
universality.    
We   can   find   in   Ricoeur’s   work   other   relevant   features   to   a   philosophically-­‐‑oriented  
feminism,   such   as   the   conflict   of   interpretations.   The   conflict   of   interpretations   opposes   the  
possibility  of  human  reason  to  have  the  last  word  about  any  specific  issue  –  a  lesson  learned  from  
Kant  –  and  calls  human  reason  to  be  understood  thorugh  rival  hermeneutical  perspectives,  which  
itself  attests  to  the  fertility  of  the  negative  –  a  lesson  learned  from  Hegel.    
The  conflict  of  interpretations,  as  a  philosophical  perspective  on  the  limits  of  rationality  and  
on  the  epistemic  role  of  alterity,  represents  a  very  important  finding  for  feminist  studies.  On  the  
one  hand,  it  justifies  the  work  of  interpretation  in  their  own  specific  hermeneutic  field,  while  on  
the   other   hand,   it   gives   rise   to   the   need   for   a   dialogue   opening   onto   new   branches   of  
interpretation,  especially  with  regard  to  anthropological  issues.    
To  read  Ricoeur  from  a  feminist  perspective  is  thus  to  remain  true  to  his  thought,  and  in  so  
doing,   to   contribute   to   the   development   of   a   philosophical   project   as   well   as   to   do   justice   to  




The   seven   essays   can   be   divided   into   two  distinct   groups.   The   first   group   includes   three  
texts   dedicated   to   more   general   reflections   on   Ricoeur’s   work   and   on   his   possible   relation   to  
questions  concerning  women  and  the  feminine.    
Under  the  title:  “The  Need  for  an  Alternative  Narrative  to  the  History  of  Ideas  or  to  Pay  a  
Debt  to  Women:  A  Feminist  Approach  to  Ricoeur’s  Thought,”  Fernanda  Henriques’  essay  aims  to  
show   that  Ricoeur’s  philosophy  –  especially  his   conception  of  memory  and  history,  on   the  one  
hand,   and   of   the   human   ability   to   take   initiative,   on   the   other   –   requires   us   to   recount   the  
philosophical   tradition  differently,  by  granting  women  a  renewed  sense  of  dignity  and   thus  by  
constructing  a  more  accurate  representation  of  ourselves.  
In   “The   Subject   of   Critique:   Ricoeur   in   Dialogue   with   Feminist   Philosophers,”   Annemie  
Halsema   accomplishes   a   twofold   task   in   establishing   that:   1)   there   is   more   proximity   than  
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theoretical   positions   can   provided   added   strength   and   coherence   to   some   findings   of   feminist  
thinkers.   This   is   what   Halsema   highlights   when   discussing   the   dialectic   established   between  
sedimentation  and  innovation,  or  between  ideology  and  utopia.    
In   the   final   text   of   this   first   group,   titled   “L’autre   feminine:   de   la   passivité   à   l’action   au  
travers   de   l’opposition,”   Carlos   Comparán   seeks   to   understand   the   notion   of   the   “feminine  
other,”  that  is,  the  feminine  as  the  other.  His  aim  is  to  “distinguish  [the  feminine]  from  both  the  
concepts  of  man  and  woman.”  He  achieves  this  by  distancing  himself   from  the  stories  of   iconic  
women:   Penelope,   Antigone,   and   Medea.   What   he   really   wants   to   stress,   though,   is   the  
conceptual  “self-­‐‑other”  or  “identity-­‐‑alterity”  relation,  understood  as  a  relation  of  recognition  –  a  
kind   of   recognition   that   sets   free   those  who   are   implicated   in   it.   Comparán’s   text   begins  with  
some   theoretical   positions   defended   by   Ricoeur   and   then   proceeds   to   a   dialogue   with   Greek  
thinking,  thus  showing  an  opposition  between  the  kind  of  world  displayed  in  an  epic  and  the  one  
presented   in   tragedy.   This   study   of   tragedy   is   very   original,   particularly   with   the   difference  
between   the   action   of  Antigone,  which   ends   in   failure,   and   the   action   of  Medea.   Based   on   the  
Ricoeurian   conception   of   the   living   metaphor   the   “seeing   as”   of   metaphor   and   Kant’s  
transcendental  schematism,  Comparán  show  Medea  to  be  the  true  figure  of  action  –  because  she  
sets  the  other  free  and  allows  him  to  start  his  life  afresh.  In  this  sense,  Medea  is  a  revolutionary  
figure  and  not  only  a  rebel.    
The   texts   composing   the   second   half   of   this   volume   put   Ricoeur’s   thought   into   dialogue  
with   feminist   authors.   The   first   of   these,   titled   “”First”   and   “Third”  World   Feminism(s):   Does  
Paul  Ricoeur’s  Philosophy  Offer  a  Way  to  Bridge  the  Gap?”  is  by  Stephanie  Riley,  who  presents  
Ricoeur’s  thought  from  the  perspective  of  Living  Up  To  Death.  She  underscores  the  originality  of  
that   book   in   two   respects:   it   is   acutely   aware   of   the   vulnerability   of   life   and   thought,   and   it  
stresses  the  importance  of  the  body  in  its  proximity  with  other  bodies.  The  aim  of  this  article  is  to  
show   an   overlap  with   the   concerns   of   feminists   like   Trinh   T.  Minh-­‐‑ha   or   Grace   Cho   –  whose  
reflections  are  concerned  with  the  links  between  bodies  and  texts,  especially  when  bodies  carry  
the  traces  of  traumas  or  when  they  are  foreign  or  excluded.  The  close  relationship  one  between  
Ricoeur’s  and  Trinh  T.  Minh-­‐‑ha’s  thought  is  also  interesting  insofar  as  it  allows  one  to  bridge,  by  
means  of  texts  and  films,  two  distinct  semiotic  fields.  
The   next   article,   “Explorations   in  Otherness:   Paul   Ricoeur   and   Luce   Irigaray,”   by  Morny  
Joy,  explores   two  philosophical  courses  –  one  of  a  man,  one  of  a  woman  –  which  seek   to   think  
otherness  as  such.  This  text  shows  that,  even  if  their  starting  points  are  rather  different,  their  end  
points  meet  and  thus  allow  for  a  fruitful  dialogue  between  them.  This  is  not  a  direct  dialogue,  but  
a  shared  will  to  work  for  justice  and  equity.  Ricoeur  trusts  in  the  power  of  metaphor  to  enlarge  
our  understanding  of  reality  and  to  bring  something  new  and  meaningful  come  into  the  world.  
That   is   not   the   case   of   Irigaray,   but   her   doubt   is   directed   toward   the   Lacanian   conception   of  
metaphor,   that   is,  of  metaphor  understood  as   substitution.  Ricoeur,  however,   is  opposed   to   this  
conception   as   well   and   thus   the   Ricoeurian   perspective   can   actually   strengthen   Irigary’s  
conception  of  metaphor.    
Under  the  title  “Être  fidèle  à  soi:  Féminisme,  éthique  et  justice  à  la  lumière  de  la  philosophie  
de  Paul  Ricoeur,”  Damien  Tissot  aims  to  show  “how  Ricoeur’s  work  provides  us  with  interesting  
resources  for  articulating  a  dual  demand  of  feminist  discourses:  a  demand  for  justice  and  for  true  
recognition.”   He   thus   enters   into   dialogue   with   Judith   Butler,   Emmanuel   Levinas,   and   Annie  
Léchenet.  First,  he  articulates   the  need  for  recognition   in   terms  of  “self-­‐‑esteem”  and  “loyalty   to  
oneself.”  This   reasoning   is  grounded  on  a   thesis  by  Annie  Léchenet,  who  proposes  a  notion  of  
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Ricoeur’s   and   Butler’s   respective   notions   of   “recognition”   and   puts   them   in   a   dialogue   with  
Levinas.   The   text   as   a   whole   shows   that   Ricoeurian   ethics   offers   useful   conceptual   tools   for  
feminist   research,   such   as   justice   and   self-­‐‑esteem.   The   notions   of   promise   and   self-­‐‑esteem,  
together,  can  provide  a  model  of  recognition  that  corresponds  with  the  idea  of  loyalty  to  oneself  –
which  can  be  concievd  as  implicit  in  feminism.  
In  the  last  text  of  this  issue,  “Ricoeur  et  Butler:  Lumières  sur  le  débat  sexe/genre,  à  travers  le  
prisme  de  l’identité  narrative,”  Marjolaine  Deschênes  shows  the  fragility  of  Butler’s  conception  of  
the   relation   between   sex   and   gender.   The   author   shows   that   the   philosophical   sources   of  
inspiration   for   Butler’s   position   –   the   genealogy   of   Nietzsche   and   Foucault   and   Derridian  
deconstruction   –   do   not   allow   her   to   overcome   certain   dualisms   and   thus   prevent   her   from  
achiever  her  goal.  Things  turn  out  differently,  according  to  Deschênes,  for  the  Ricoeurian  notions  
of   three-­‐‑fold  mimesis   and   narrative   identity.   They   avoid   dichotomies   and   hierarchies,   and   one  
thereby  acquires  a  more  useful  understanding  of  identity.    
To  conclude,   I  would   like   to  express  my  gratitude  to  all   those  who  have  been   involved   in  
preparing   this   issue.  First  and   foremost,  my  deepest  gratitude  goes   to   Johann  Michel  and  Scott  
Davidson,  who  worked  on   this  volume  with  me,  as  well  as   Jérôme  Porée  who  helped  with   the  
revision   of   this   introduction.   I   would   like   also   to   thank   all   the   members   of   the   Editorial  
Committee  who  helped  with  the  selection  and  revisions  of  the  articles.    
Fernanda  Henriques  
University of Évora (Portugal) 
	  
